

DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 183 248

PS 011 215

AUTHOR Smith, David G.
TITLE The International Year of the Child - 1979: 'More of Same' or Radical Critique? Curriculum, Media & Instruction Occasional Paper No. 8.
INSTITUTION Alberta Univ., Edmonton. Faculty of Education.
REPORT NO CMI-OP-8
PUB DATE 79
NOTE 16p.
AVAILABLE FROM Secondary Education Publications, Department of Secondary Education, University of Alberta, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada T6G 2G5 (\$1.50)

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC01 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS Adults; *Child Development; *Childhood Needs; Children; *Global Approach; *Research Problems; *Social Science Research
IDENTIFIERS *Epistemology; *International Year of the Child; *Phenomenology

ABSTRACT

Delegates to the Canadian planning meeting of the International Year of the Child showed most interest in attending workshops on the topic of children in the international context (rather than in a single country context) and least interest in the topic of research. These choices may reflect a realization that (1) if we are to understand our own situation with children more clearly we must stop looking only at ourselves and our children and come to view 'Ourselves' more in the context of 'Others', and that (2) more and more people are sensing that 'traditional research regarding children is incapable of shedding light on the fundamental questions we face with children today. The inadequacies of traditional research are linked with its epistemological stance. Phenomenology presents a radical critique of this stance and suggests the sense in which an understanding of ourselves -- as children and adults -- must involve a recognition of the intersubjectivity of human existence and our dependence on one another for a sense of our own Being. To see the world intersubjectively means that we cannot more fully understand ourselves simply by more intensive introspection about our own localized situations. We need to spend more time in dialogue with those who seem most different from us. (Author/SS)

* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made *
* from the original document. *

ED183248

PS011215

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
EDUCATION & WELFARE
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
EDUCATION

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN REPRODUCED EXACTLY AS RECEIVED FROM THE PERSON OR ORGANIZATION ORIGINATING IT. POINTS OF VIEW OR OPINIONS STATED DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT OFFICIAL NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION POSITION OR POLICY.

The International Year of the Child - 1979

'More of Same' or Radical Critique?



DAVID G. SMITH
The University of Alberta

Occasional Paper No. 8



Department of Secondary Education
Faculty of Education The University of Alberta

"PERMISSION TO REPRODUCE THIS
MATERIAL HAS BEEN GRANTED BY

Ted T. Aoki

PS
CURRICULUM, MEDIA & INSTRUCTION

To Our Reader:

This paper is part of the Department of Secondary Education's CMI Publication Series. It is an occasional paper, and as such we invite you to focus on a dimension of the field of CURRICULUM, MEDIA AND INSTRUCTION. It is also an informal paper and as such it is meant to allow the author to bring to the reader thoughts at some moment of development, from an early exploratory moment to a later more refined moment.

The series hopefully will consist of papers "occasionally" printed as relevant papers come our way. We see them as conversation pieces - "thought-works" that might engage readers and, possibly on occasions author and reader, to come together in a face-to-face "talk-talk".

Thus, we recognize the papers as being essentially incomplete, rooted in the idea that collaborations cannot be exhausted by an actual paper nor any actual reader. We ask you, our reader to collaborate by using the papers to grasp the reason for the essential incompleteness, that is, we ask you to grasp the conception of analysis which makes the papers possible. We ask you this because we feel that these papers themselves, although they have to be used to make the point, are never the point.

The point is, as far as we are concerned, in collaborative dialogue.

Communications Committee
Department of Secondary Education

Sr. Therese Craig
Dr. Madeleine Monod
Dr. Douglas Engel
Dr. T. Aoki
Shirley Brauer, Research
Assistant

CMI

Occasional Paper Series
No. 8

Published by

The Department of
Secondary Education
Faculty of Education
The University of Alberta

Copyright © 1979
held by the author


THE INTERNATIONAL YEAR OF THE CHILD - 1979:

'MORE OF SAME' OR RADICAL CRITIQUE?

David G. Smith*

On March 9, 1978, the Canadian Committee - 1979 International Year of the Child (IYC) held a meeting of voluntary organizations at the Skyline Hotel in Ottawa.¹ More than 300 people attended, representing national voluntary and non-governmental organizations, federal and some provincial governments, business, labour and academia, as well as interested individuals. On calling the meeting to order the chairman outlined briefly the aims for the day, allowing various groups to exchange information and ideas about plans and projects for "celebrating" IYC in Canada. Members were told that the basic interest of the United Nations was for each nation to concentrate on the problems and opportunities of their own country. The chairman concluded his introductory remarks with the reminder that the results of the meeting would be reported widely, and therefore "everyone should make an effort to put aside differences to ensure its success". The delegates then dispersed to participate in a variety of workshops on such topics as Legal Rights, Education, Health, etc. In each workshop, ideas were discussed and a total of 181 project proposals were generated, to be administered according to a one million dollar budget.

The Conference's most interesting feature may have been a hidden one, namely the choices delegates made as to which workshops to attend. As the graph below indicates, the most commonly selected was that dealing with children in an international context - in spite of the U.N. urgings to the contrary. (International Concerns were last on the conference's list of agenda priorities.) Also of note was that the "Research" workshop attracted the least interest of all.



* David G. Smith is currently a doctoral student in the Department of Elementary Education with interest in the notion of the child in curriculum inquiry. He holds an M.A. degree in Curriculum Studies, U.B.C.

I believe these two choices may be indicative of an important trend to which those concerned with IYC might wish to pay close attention. They represent two sides of the same issue. One is that if we are to understand our own situation with children more clearly we must stop looking only at ourselves and our children and come to view 'Ourselves' more in the context of 'Others'. We must stop thinking 'introspectively' and begin thinking 'relationally'. Secondly, I wonder if the small interest shown in the "Research" workshop may not indicate that more and more people are sensing that traditional research regarding children is incapable of shedding light on the fundamental questions we face with children today. A new understanding of, and direction for, research may be needed. Some new directions are available to us which perhaps warrant more open and urgent articulation.

It is increasingly commonplace in academic circles to recognize that what has passed as the "Scientific Method" of research is an inheritance from a particular epistemological tradition rooted in eighteenth century Enlightenment thought.² At the risk of oversimplification it may be argued that the view is premised on several fundamental assumptions about the nature of the world in which we live. One is that 'to know' means to 'know about', say, phenomenon X, as it exists in the world. It implies the existence of a knower and an object of his knowing. A knowledgeable person, say a specialist in X's, is one who has devoted much time and study to X's in their various modalities and contexts. Too, it is contingent upon this view that the knower must always see himself to exist as somehow distinct and separate from the object of his knowing. Indeed the refinement of such knowledge depends on the 'objective' attitude of the knower (researcher) vis à vis the object of his interest, and poor research in this context is that in which the personality of the researcher is too obviously a part of his interpreted conclusions.

A second assumption is that the objective world is made up of discrete, isolable phenomena. Understanding the relationship between them, through their isolation, observation, and manipulation as variables, is the basis upon which prediction and control become possible, these latter capabilities being the chief end of the scientific enterprise.

This particular way of knowing about the world, of understanding, traceable at least through Descartes, is at the heart of all the hard sciences from which we have received so much material benefit, and even though the Scottish philosopher David Hume argued as early as 1738 that human behaviour was far too complex an affair to be studied by such a method,³ many social scientists even today insist that it is the only method whereby we can obtain valid and reliable information about affaires

humaine. In this view, human social life can be broken down into isolable components which in turn can be objectively observed, manipulated, predicted, and subsequently controlled. As we have said, the success of the method depends on the ability of the researcher to see the focus of his concern objectively, to appreciate himself as somehow removed from the subject of his interest, and to free himself, his mindfulness of himself, from personal involvement with that which he is attempting to understand. He must try to separate his mindfulness of himself from his mindfulness of his study. Therefore one might argue that a social scientist will be all the more successful the more completely he is out of his mind as he goes about his work: to study human beings he must first become less than human himself.

In the case of research concerning children, this view has some powerful, even frightening implications. One is that for such research to be possible at all, children by definition must be objectified and rendered as social isolates. Another is that it becomes possible to say one 'understands' or 'knows' children all the more deeply on the basis of a deliberate refusal to be subjectively affected by them. I would argue that these assumptions underlie some of our most profound difficulties and may help to explain why, as John Holt suggests, childhood has become a type of social trap.⁴ Similarly, we may understand why, when children are spoken about or visually depicted in modern Western culture, they are so often portrayed alone in some sort of grand or tragic isolation. When children are discussed as 'a problem', it is really adults who have the problem. We must learn to understand the way our epistemological assumptions work for us, otherwise our attempts to 'understand' our young may only involve a deeper and deeper entrenchment in extant alienations.

A personal experience may serve in illustration. Some years ago on emerging from university with a B.A. in Social Science I was delighted (in a manner of speaking) to be hired as a staff worker at a residential 'treatment centre' for emotionally disturbed children. The centre was established to receive and rehabilitate pre-teen children who in their various histories had failed to respond positively to the salvific efforts of foster parents, social workers and psychiatrists. The centre was regarded as a last resort before an inevitably more serious form of incarceration, which would not only protect the children from themselves, but also 'society' (you and me) from the children. One feature of their behaviour was that social graces were elementally reduced. Happiness was expressed in wild shrieks and frantic hugging; anger in open displays of defecation, urination or sexually saturated language. It did not take long to begin wondering what all those courses in Abnormal Psychology and Sociology of Deviance could possibly contribute in the face of these cir-

cumstances. Certainly they were of use in providing rationales as to 'how children could get like this' and in enabling one confidently to label the children as 'sick', but when confronted with the task-at-hand-what to do about it-those insights seemed strangely empty.

The centre was in its infancy then and those of us on staff were all young and idealistic. Under the guidance of the directing psychiatrist, programs were developed for each child based on what was thought to be sound theoretical foundation and the latest research. What began to emerge over the course of time, however, was that the efficacy of any particular 'treatment program' seemed not to be in the program itself, but rather came as a reflection of 'something else'. If signs of progress with the children began to appear, it was not the therapy program, as theoretically formulated, which seemed to be the key factor, but rather a radical transformation of the therapist's understanding of himself, in relation to the children under his care. In fact, as long as the children were labelled 'sick' - categorically different from the 'healthy' therapist - nothing constructive seemed to happen. Confrontation between the 'behaviour modifier' and the one to be modified often only grew more intense, or frustrating, so that the child's condition came to be regarded as 'worse than originally thought' or even hopeless.

In time, however, many of us began to feel that our own helplessness as helpers was a message in itself; that we were being confronted with an even more powerful reality, namely, that only by shedding our theoretical infatuations could we begin to hear effectively what the children were saying about themselves and their world. And the more we heard, the more we realized that their world was also our world. Their sense of being ill was really only a more agonized form of our own petty neuroticism. It was only that we had learned more cleverly the art of sophisticated concealment. Once the equality of our presence with the children became clearer, as we realized that whatever was the meaning of our presence in the world, it was at least a shared presence, then things began to happen. As we dropped our defences, which came in the form of vigorous enthusiasm for various schools of psychological thought, so, too, did the children drop theirs. Their anger - previously raged, I am convinced, at the vain assumptions being made about their nature - became less violent as the source of ignition slowly revealed itself.

The point here is to say that the way (method) whereby we came to understand the meaning of child care as a healing art may in fact reflect something fundamental about the way human life 'actually works'. The process involved four basic shifts:

1. A realization of our shared presence with the children,
2. A suspension of our prior theoretical conviction about the way 'children are supposed to be' or 'what a child is',
3. A willingness to become vulnerable as adults in such a way that we were subjectively affected by them, and to see their sickness as a judgement on our own health, just as much as the reverse.
4. A recognition that any future must be seen as a shared future.

As a graduate student some ten years later I was surprised to discover in the philosophical movement known as Phenomenology an articulation of these themes as central concerns of a radical critique of Enlightenment science.

(II)

To attempt to reduce phenomenological understanding to a few basic themes is not the purpose here, if only because the field is too diverse and complex for such an undertaking in this context. One might query in passing why it is that a movement which began as a search for a way into life's 'essences' has had such difficulty expressing itself 'essentially' in a manner that can be useful to people at large.

In 1940 an essay appeared in the U.S.A. entitled "Phenomenology and the Social Sciences" written by Alfred Schutz.⁵ Schutz was a disciple of the movement's inspiring genius, Edmund Husserl, and his article was an attempt to describe ideas about personality and culture which Husserl had planned for a book to be named "The Crisis of the European Sciences". The interest was to explain, among other things, how it had come about that scientific understanding, particularly of culture, had come to be emptied of meaning; how a divorce had taken place between the mind of the 'knower' and the life-world of his knowing.

For Husserl and subsequently Schutz, the problem was rooted in the way in which the method (including formulae and theories) whereby original understanding of the world takes place becomes itself constituted historically as 'true being' in the mind of the knower. What is needed, they argued, is a method - the method, Husserl once said - whereby it can be possible to perennially recover a sense of "the things themselves" of the life-world as they exist without burden of theoretical overlay or what Schutz calls the "cloak of ideas". It is an attempt to understand how to reactivate the primal situation of which idealizations or meaning-producing activities can only be but an expression. Husserl argued that if such reactivation does not occur, several things can happen. One is that as the idealizations, theories, methods or meaning structures

are handed on as tradition, the basis of meaning, the life-world or lived experience without which theories and idealizations could not even be possible, becomes forgotten. What is more, the proper meaning of methods, formulae, etc., remains unintelligible. The long-range consequence, as Schutz puts it:

is a dualistic cleavage into a real
and self-contained corporeal world,
and a mental world.

A sort of schizoid split occurs whereby we come to believe that what we describe to be 'out there' really is out there. We take our descriptions, interpretations, theoretical formulations and portrayals of what is 'out there' to be "true being" (in Schutz's words), instead of what they in fact are - subjectively intuited and constituted constructions of the mind. This does not mean that there is in fact nothing 'out there'; only that everything we say about it in fact begins 'in here', in our minds. What comes to be passed on as objective knowledge always begins as subjective apprehension. This is one reason why a plea throughout the phenomenological literature is for a return to "the things themselves", which can only begin with the radical realization that all that has been said in the course of our history about 'the things' of this world are not in themselves "the things". They are always, by definition, 'about the things', never the things. The central concern of most phenomenological investigation is to ask how it can be possible to recover a sense of the 'in-itselfness' of the life-world.

This leads to two other themes which are key to Schutz's exposition of Husserl, and which are presented as seminal for a phenomenological method of social science. These concern the transcendental reduction, or epoché; and an understanding of the intersubjectivity of the life-world. For Husserl, a true revealing of the life-world could only begin on the basis of a suspension of belief in its existence. As Schutz pointed out, this does not mean that phenomenology denies the actual existence of the real world, or explains it as mere illusion, but only that for this indubitability to be made intelligible at all, one had to begin by proving the relativity of the life-world to the subjectivity of its 'sedimented apprehendedness' as tradition. One might put it thus: For me to see the world as-it-is, I must first bring to doubt all my previous beliefs concerning the nature of its existence. Unless this is done, I take to be true and utterly real, what are in fact the subjectively constituted sediments of cultural deposit. I thereby deprive myself of the possibility of seeing the things of this world in themselves - of seeing the very realities which make sedimented 'objective knowledge' possible in the first place. To "break this dictatorship" (to use William Luijpen's phrase)⁶

of posited understanding, one must deprive the world which formerly, in one's naive or "natural" attitude, was simply accepted as Being itself, and, in Schutz's words "return to the living stream of one's experiences of the world". As he summarizes it:

In the epoché... I abstain from
belief in the being of this world,
and I direct my view exclusively
to my consciousness of the world.

By understanding the world as my consciousness of it, the dualistic cleavage between corporeal world and mental world, between the world of Others and the world of myself becomes reconciled, for just as in a sense I come to understand that (for me) nothing exists in this world apart from my consciousness of it, so my consciousness cannot exist apart from the world in which its existence is possible. I and the world are one. My existence is nothing if not (at least) existence-in-the-world.

Schutz's understanding of the world as intersubjective leads clearly from this. For the life-world which is subjectively constituted is not my private world. 'Others' also belong to it, not only as other bodies or as objects of my experience of this world, but as alter egos, that is to say as subjectivities which are endowed with the same activities of consciousness as am I. Thus we might say, for example, that all cultural objects (books, tools, etc.) point back, by their very origin and meaning, to other subjects and to their active "constitutive intentionalities"⁷ and hence it is that they are experienced as "existing there for everybody". A book could not be consciously appreciated as a book unless it presented itself to everyone as such. It is because 'we all think' it is a book that I am able to say 'I think' it is one too. Thus it is that a person who claims 'to know' something in complete isolation from a community of knowers is regarded as either mad or divine, labels few of us would wish to acknowledge for ourselves. But just as there can be no 'I think' without a 'We think', so there can be no 'I' without 'You', no 'Me' without 'Us', indeed no 'We' without 'They'.

This is what makes the phenomenological understanding of intersubjectivity different from, say, a simple view that, of course, human beings share the same world and that for smooth social intercourse we must acknowledge and tolerate each other's differences. Such a view can contain the hidden presumption that by nature individuals still exist as somehow discrete and fundamentally separate or isolate, and that social relations are establishable purely on the basis of moral, ethical or legal agreement. Intersubjective understanding of the social world,

in the sense we are presenting it here, means that in fact for anyone to be aware of his existence at all, he needs someone else. Alone, we cannot even understand ourselves to exist. I only know myself to be 'here' because I understand you to be 'there'. If I could find no-one 'there' neither could I understand myself to be 'here'. That is why a person who believes that there is no-one 'there' for him, in a deep sense, is so often haunted by a feeling of being somehow less than human, and why it is we become most desperate when we believe ourselves to be most alone, as any psychologist will say.

(III)

What could all this mean for the International Year of the Child - 1979? I believe it is possible to sketch out several important ways in which these insights could inform our reflection:

1. All our descriptions, theories, formulations, which attempt to speak about 'the child' or 'children' can never lay claim to the "true being" of children. Whatever children may be they are always more than our descriptions and theoretical analyses concerning their nature. They are what make our theories of childhood possible: but childhood can never be just our theories about it. No matter how expert we may think ourselves to be, when we stand before a child (or anyone else) we stand before a mystery - naive - until together we unveil our shared meaning.

Our theories, descriptions, formulae, etc., come to us in the form of sedimented meaning. As such they have a definite history and course of development which we must constantly bring to awareness lest we take them as, in themselves, descriptions of "true being". For all the historiographic and interpretive weaknesses of Philippe Ariès' landmark work on the history of childhood,⁸ he still can take credit for raising the reasonable doubt as to whether the concept of childhood actually existed in the Western world before the sixteenth century. In a similar vein, William Kessen's book of the 1960's attempted to locate child development theory deeply within the history of philosophy and its offspring, science.⁹ But far more of this sort of 'meta-research' is needed, a vision being carried by one of Kessen's former students-Arlene Skolnick.¹⁰ The social and educational implications of this revealing of the problematic nature of our conceptualities concerning children is a critical issue for research today.

2. Unless we are capable of suspending belief in our theories of childhood, we deprive ourselves of the possibility of understanding more richly the meanings children have for us. Without doubt, we have not always made them so much the centre of our humanitarian interests, nor so isolated them as a social category fit for 'scientific research'.

Indeed one might ask the question, not facetiously: "How in fact does it help us to label children as children?" If we load the label with too many assumptions do not make it more and more difficult for children to cease to be just that? Of course, children have certain special needs - care during their early vulnerability, etc., but in what ways are their needs any more intense than those of others on the human continuum? I believe we should stop regarding children as some sort of 'unique species' and try to understand the meaning of their existence much more fundamentally within the context of human life as a whole. If this is not done, several things could happen:

- a) Children may come to regard themselves more and more as simply that - children - and their growth toward maturity will be impeded rather than facilitated. Erik Erikson tells of a psychiatrist friend who asked his young son what he wanted to be when big and strong. The child replied: "I want to be a patient!", a remark interpreted as meaning he so thoroughly enjoyed being the focus of such absorbing interest to the adults around him that any other kind of life was unthinkable.¹¹
 - b) Some research is indicating there may be a relationship, culturally, between an idealized romanticized view of childhood and child abuse.¹² On the one hand, as children become, in Kessen's term, "Cultural Heroes", youth as a state of being can become more and more esteemed as the 'true being' of human life, the summum bonum of existence, so to speak. But as adults try more eagerly to recapture their lost childhoods so children themselves come to be regarded as a burden or hindrance in that quest. So in a strange sense, a culture that idolizes childhood can find children, in hard reality, a nuisance.
3. We need to bring to awareness the intersubjectivity of human existence, namely our dependence on one another for a sense of our own Being. Just as children could never understand themselves as immature without the presence of mature adults, so adults could never understand themselves as such without the presence of young ones. This may be one reason why so many young teachers claim to 'love children' - because the latter's naivete brings to awareness the former's growing sense of personal wisdom.

There are further implications of intersubjectivity for research. Any research field which claims to be concerned with 'Child Study' is essentially incomplete if it does not take with complete seriousness the child as situated, sine qua non, within the broader context of

culture as a whole. By definition, intersubjectively, one cannot study children without at the same time studying adults, if only because there would in fact be no children without adults to bring them into being. A social science which attempts to study 'children alone' is doomed to conceptual and theoretical bankruptcy.

By implication too, concern about children's rights cannot be understood without concern for what is right for all. This is not to undermine the proper concern to protect children legally from abuse, but only to acknowledge the deep interconnectedness of social well-being. Otherwise 'rights' can take the form of weapons by which and in defense of which the most immoral acts can be committed. We need to remember that historically, from Plato to Adam Smith, the concern for human rights has always grown from a concern that 'what is right' - an ethical and moral issue, not just juridical - be given a chance to flourish.¹³

And finally there is the matter of growing interest in the international context of our study; an interest, we noted at the start, that the United Nations chose to ignore, despite contrary public demonstration. To see the world intersubjectively means that we cannot more fully understand ourselves simply by more intensive introspection about our own localized situations. To be sure, the 'problems' of children in the West are very different from those for children in other parts of the world, but they are still problems in the same world. The world in which children die of starvation and exposure is the same world where children suffer from obesity and existential meaninglessness. The world where children have no hope for opportunity is the same one where children have so many opportunities they are left dazed and confused, seeking escape in mad fancies. If it is true, intersubjectively, that we can only understand ourselves through others, then we need to spend more time in dialogue with those who seem most different from us, thereby attempting to grasp more deeply what here has only been hinted - that if there is to be a future, let us see it at least as a shared future. Otherwise, what is there about IYC - 1979 really worth "celebrating"?

FOOTNOTES

1. Report of Proceedings, Second General Meeting of Non-Governmental Organizations for 1979 - International Year of the Child. Canadian Committee - 1979 IYC. Ottawa, (March 9) 1978.
2. Norman Hampson, A Cultural History of the Enlightenment, New York, Pantheon Books, 1968.
3. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, vol. 1, London, Dent, 1960.
4. John Holt, Escape from Childhood, New York, Ballantyne Books, 1974.
5. Alfred Schutz, "Phenomenology and the Social Sciences", in Marvin Farber, ed. Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1940. All quotations of Schutz are taken from this essay.
6. William Luijpen, Phenomenology and Humanism, Pittsburgh, Duquesne U. Press, 1966, p.7.
7. The theme of 'intentionality' is central in both Husserl and Schutz, but we cannot develop it here. Briefly it is understood as the most basic characteristic of consciousness. It is always consciousness of something; directed toward something, and in turn is "determined by the intentional object whereof it is a consciousness." An intentional act is any act in and through which a person experiences an object, whether physical or ideal. Through it, the object is coquitively constituted. See Alfred Schutz On Phenomenology and Social Relations W.R. Wagner, ed. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1970, pp. 318,319.
8. Philippe Aries, Centuries of Childhood, R. Baldick New York, Vintage Books, 1962.
9. William Kessen, The Child, New York, Wiley, 1965.
10. Arlene Skolnick ed., Rethinking Childhood, Boston, Little, Brown, and Company, 1976.
Also see "The Limits of Childhood: Conceptions of Child Development and Social Context," Law and Contemporary Problems, vol. 39, No. 3, Summer, 1975, pp. 60-90.
11. Erik H. Erikson, Childhood and Society, New York, Norton, 1963, p. 414.
12. Sarane Spence Boocock, "Children in Contemporary Society," in Skolnick ed., Rethinking Childhood, pp. 414-436.
13. Tibor R. Machan, Human Rights and Human Liberties, Chicago, Nelson Hall, 1975.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Aries, Philippe. Centuries of Childhood, R. Baldick tr. New York, Vintage Books, 1962.
- Boocock, Sarane Spence, "Children in Contemporary Society." in Arlene Skolnick, ed. Rethinking Childhood, Boston, Little, Brown, and Company, 1976.
- Erikson, Erik H. Childhood and Society. New York, Norton, 1963.
- Hampson, Norman. A Cultural History of the Enlightenment. New York, Pantheon Books, 1968.
- Holt, John. Escape from Childhood. New York, Ballantyne Books, 1974.
- Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature, vol. 1. London, Dent, 1960.
- Kessen, William. The Child. New York, Wiley, 1965.
- Luijpen, William. Phenomenology and Humanism. Pittsburgh, Duquesne University Press, 1966.
- Machan, Tibor R. Human Rights and Human Liberties. Chicago, Nelson Hall, 1975.
- Schutz, Alfred. "Phenomenology and the Social Sciences", in Marvin Farber, ed. Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1940.
- Phenomenology and Social Relations, Helmut Wagner, ed. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1970.
- Second General Meeting of Non-Governmental Organizations for 1979 - International Year of the Child. Report of Proceedings. Canadian Committee - 1979 IYC, Ottawa, March 9, 1978.
- Skolnick, Arlene, ed. Rethinking Childhood, Boston, Little, Brown, and Company, 1976.
- "The Limits of Childhood: Conceptions of Child Development and Social Context." Law and Contemporary Problems, vol. 39, No. 3, Summer, 1975. pp. 60-90.

DEPT. OF SECONDARY EDUCATION PUBLICATIONS

CMI OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES

- | | | |
|-------|--|--------|
| No. 1 | "Democracy and Evaluation"
by Barry MacDonald, University of East Anglia, U.K. | \$1.00 |
| No. 2 | "Toward Curriculum Inquiry In a New Key"
by Ted T. Aoki, University of Alberta, Edmonton | \$1.00 |
| No. 3 | "Talk about School Subjects: A Sociological View"
by Richard D. Heyman, The University of Calgary | \$1.00 |
| No. 4 | A. "Art Education in One Dimension:
Reaching into the Future from the Perspective of
Ideology." (1977)

B. "An Inquiry into the Process of Aesthetic Socialization
During School Tours at an Art Museum." (1978)
by Nancy R. Johnson, Department of Art
Education, State University of New York | \$1.00 |
| No. 5 | "The Future—Its Challenge and Implications
for Public Decision Making."
Desmond E. Berghofer, Assistant Deputy Minister,
Alberta Advanced Education and Manpower | \$1.00 |
| No. 6 | "Teaching as Being: The Right to Personhood"
by Beverley A. Cunningham,
University of British Columbia | \$1.00 |
| No. 7 | "Curriculum in Alberta: A Study of Perceptions"
by Kim Krawchenko, Pat Paradis,
and Bill Sommerfeld, University of Alberta | \$1.00 |
| No. 8 | "The International Year of the Child—1979:
'More of Same' or Radical Critique?"
by David G. Smith, University of Alberta | \$1.00 |

Please Note: Shipping costs are added to above prices.